Summary:
The review meeting was held in SLB premises with the attendance of all relevant discipline personnel to demonstrate and confirm the status of the topics covered by the verification scope.

The review team was received in a welcoming and positive atmosphere where questions were answered in an open and honest way. SLB had prepared a very good presentation that supported the verification scope and demonstrated a transparent overview and mutual interest to meet the requirements.

A safety moment was held at the start of the meeting addressing the significant impact sleep has on body and mind.
Encouraging all to prioritise between 7 and 9 hours each day to perform safely and sustainably.

The SLB team appreciated to be subjected to the 3rd party review by the Operator, which is not common.

A brief introduction to the upcoming projects Bestla and Draugen with key deliverables from a cementing standpoint was held.

SLB informed that this type of cross rental agreements between the cementing companies are common on the Norwegian Continental Shelf. SLB have a cement unit handover every 1-2 months, and they have good relationships with both Baker and Halliburton. The Baker Seahawk cement unit installed on DSY is known to SLB and they have experience with the model. All 6 senior cementers planned for the project have previous experience with the Seahawk unit. One of them has experience from DSY. SLB presented that competency is managed in three independent systems in the SLB; Step, Degreed and QUEST.

A mixing error incident in 2023 on Askepott with the same type of unit resulted in several weeks of downtime. When asked about this incident, SLB explained that they have good knowledge of cause and mitigations as this was openly shared by Halliburton who was operating the unit. This demonstrates that continuous improvement, through experience sharing is implemented between Halliburton, SLB and Baker. Whether this experience has led to a change of the maintenance program was on the other hand not known. SLB confirmed that non-productive time on the cement unit is investigated, where the maintenance organization is included to ensure that any learning from the incident will lead to an evaluation of the risk-based maintenance program. Failure mode analysis on equipment components will be initiated should an equipment component fail. Performance analysis of parts is thus used to updated and review the maintenance program.

SLB demonstrated statistics indicating that their focus on quality and technical performance in close cooperation with customers have resulted in significant improvements over the recent years. Non-productive time is reduced significantly from 941 hrs in 2022 to 97 hours in 2024, with 2 hrs of accumulated NPT currently reported YTD.

Equipment bulletins from 3rd party vendors are received by the maintenance manager. However, SLB does currently not have a system to ensure structurally report, manage and follow up those bulletins. It was agreed in the meeting that this is an improvement which should be implemented across the maintenance organization to ensure that equipment bulletins are managed and followed up with the necessary level of quality.

The SLB maintenance organization was presented from a roles and responsibilities view and the risk-based maintenance escalation philosophy outlined and explained with examples. Management of non-conformances and deviation, exemptions are controlled through the HSE standard. Deferred maintenance towards safety critical components falls under the exemption process which is a risk assessed and formally approved in the QUEST system. MOC’s are a non-risked assessed approval process in QUEST. The drilling contractor confirmed that the cement unit on DSY is not part of the IFS maintenance system, and that the maintenance supervisor receives a status of the cement unit maintenance. However, it was confirmed during the meeting that deferred maintenance, whether safety critical or non-safety critical is not communicated to the drilling contractor who has the overall maintenance ownership of the mobile drilling unit. Typical documentation that is shared and entered IFS is maintenance records. This concludes that the asset owner does not have a full barrier status overview on the mobile drilling unit and has no detailed knowledge what mitigating actions are defined during the exemption process to reduce the risk of overdue maintenance to an ALARP level. Agreed during the meeting that in cooperation with OD a document shall be prepared which defines the level of documentation which is required to be shared by the cementing service company on a weekly basis. The SLB team explained that the FMEA documentation for the Baker unit is made available for them, and that work is planned to incorporate the DSY unit into SLB CMMS, Maximo, based on these analyses and the recommended PM regime from Baker. Equipment service will be built up by Service levels SL0 – SL4 built from a reliability centred maintenance approach with PM detail and frequency adjusted to reflect expected failure data. Currently the DSY cement unit hierarchy is not part of the Maximo maintenance system, although SLB has operated the cement unit historically.
Provided that OKEA will commence operations with DSY in July 2025, the review team requested that a project schedule and allocated resources will be discussed regulatory to ensure that the maintenance program on the DSY cement unit meets the regulatory requirements and is in compliance with NORSOK Z-008.

SLB will implement Key Performance Indicators to monitor the maintenance performance of the cement unit. From the presentation it was however not obvious that Maximo is easily able to report overdue, and deferred maintenance status for planned and corrective maintenance work orders for high, medium and low criticality. As part of the mentioned level of documentation requirements the review team requested that those KPI’s as a minimum shall be made available to OD completed with approved Exemptions and MOC.

It was also observed that estimated work hours for preventive and corrective maintenance workorders are not defined in the maintenance system. The maintenance review team highlighted that overdue PM’s in itself are not representing a transparent picture of the overdue maintenance. To achieve a transparent overview of overdue maintenance, work hours shall be defined in the maintenance system to ensure that the correct actions will be taken to correct this.

An outline of the Audit regime was explained in the meeting, with annual QMS self-audits and HQ audits every 3rd year.
Quality verifications of SLB third parties are scheduled and managed by the SLB procurement organization based on criticality.
The SLB maintenance team could not demonstrate that the procurement team has any quality verifications or audits planned in 2025 towards third parties with critical deliveries of cement unit components.

Critical spare parts were also discussed in the meeting. SLB plan to be fully compliant with NORSOK Z-008 Risk based maintenance and consequence classification. SLB elaborated on the three levels of critical spare parts based on severity, occurrence and detectability.

Barrier strategy and performance standards were discussed as part of the agenda. SLB presented a general bow-tie approach and presented various SLB standards where performance criteria were defined. However currently SLB does not meet the performance standard requirement towards technical barrier elements on the cement unit as per Norsok Z-008 and Norsok S-001.

Conclusions:
Since SLB is currently not operating the cement unit on DSY, the review team is not able to define any finding as nonconformances towards regulatory and contractual requirements with respect to Risk Based Maintenance. Significant improvement suggestions have been observed during the review which, if not corrected in due time before the commencement date of the rig contract towards OKEA, will automatically lead to red risk non-conformities. As such those observations shall be corrected before OKEA starts the Bestla development campaign with DSY.

The full list of improvement suggestions and observations are listed below, as were discussed and agreed as follows below during the close-out of the meeting.

Summary:
The review meeting was held in SLB premises with the attendance of all relevant discipline personnel to demonstrate and confirm the status of the topics covered by the verification scope.

The review team was received in a welcoming and positive atmosphere where questions were answered in an open and honest way. SLB had prepared a very good presentation that supported the verification scope and demonstrated a transparent overview and mutual interest to meet the requirements.

A safety moment was held at the start of the meeting addressing the significant impact sleep has on body and mind.
Encouraging all to prioritise between 7 and 9 hours each day to perform safely and sustainably.

The SLB team appreciated to be subjected to the 3rd party review by the Operator, which is not common.

A brief introduction to the upcoming projects Bestla and Draugen with key deliverables from a cementing standpoint was held.

SLB informed that this type of cross rental agreements between the cementing companies are common on the Norwegian Continental Shelf. SLB have a cement unit handover every 1-2 months, and they have good relationships with both Baker and Halliburton. The Baker Seahawk cement unit installed on DSY is known to SLB and they have experience with the model. All 6 senior cementers planned for the project have previous experience with the Seahawk unit. One of them has experience from DSY. SLB presented that competency is managed in three independent systems in the SLB; Step, Degreed and QUEST.

A mixing error incident in 2023 on Askepott with the same type of unit resulted in several weeks of downtime. When asked about this incident, SLB explained that they have good knowledge of cause and mitigations as this was openly shared by Halliburton who was operating the unit. This demonstrates that continuous improvement, through experience sharing is implemented between Halliburton, SLB and Baker. Whether this experience has led to a change of the maintenance program was on the other hand not known. SLB confirmed that non-productive time on the cement unit is investigated, where the maintenance organization is included to ensure that any learning from the incident will lead to an evaluation of the risk-based maintenance program. Failure mode analysis on equipment components will be initiated should an equipment component fail. Performance analysis of parts is thus used to updated and review the maintenance program.

SLB demonstrated statistics indicating that their focus on quality and technical performance in close cooperation with customers have resulted in significant improvements over the recent years. Non-productive time is reduced significantly from 941 hrs in 2022 to 97 hours in 2024, with 2 hrs of accumulated NPT currently reported YTD.

Equipment bulletins from 3rd party vendors are received by the maintenance manager. However, SLB does currently not have a system to ensure structurally report, manage and follow up those bulletins. It was agreed in the meeting that this is an improvement which should be implemented across the maintenance organization to ensure that equipment bulletins are managed and followed up with the necessary level of quality.

The SLB maintenance organization was presented from a roles and responsibilities view and the risk-based maintenance escalation philosophy outlined and explained with examples. Management of non-conformances and deviation, exemptions are controlled through the HSE standard. Deferred maintenance towards safety critical components falls under the exemption process which is a risk assessed and formally approved in the QUEST system. MOC’s are a non-risked assessed approval process in QUEST. The drilling contractor confirmed that the cement unit on DSY is not part of the IFS maintenance system, and that the maintenance supervisor receives a status of the cement unit maintenance. However, it was confirmed during the meeting that deferred maintenance, whether safety critical or non-safety critical is not communicated to the drilling contractor who has the overall maintenance ownership of the mobile drilling unit. Typical documentation that is shared and entered IFS is maintenance records. This concludes that the asset owner does not have a full barrier status overview on the mobile drilling unit and has no detailed knowledge what mitigating actions are defined during the exemption process to reduce the risk of overdue maintenance to an ALARP level. Agreed during the meeting that in cooperation with OD a document shall be prepared which defines the level of documentation which is required to be shared by the cementing service company on a weekly basis. The SLB team explained that the FMEA documentation for the Baker unit is made available for them, and that work is planned to incorporate the DSY unit into SLB CMMS, Maximo, based on these analyses and the recommended PM regime from Baker. Equipment service will be built up by Service levels SL0 – SL4 built from a reliability centred maintenance approach with PM detail and frequency adjusted to reflect expected failure data. Currently the DSY cement unit hierarchy is not part of the Maximo maintenance system, although SLB has operated the cement unit historically.
Provided that OKEA will commence operations with DSY in July 2025, the review team requested that a project schedule and allocated resources will be discussed regulatory to ensure that the maintenance program on the DSY cement unit meets the regulatory requirements and is in compliance with NORSOK Z-008.

SLB will implement Key Performance Indicators to monitor the maintenance performance of the cement unit. From the presentation it was however not obvious that Maximo is easily able to report overdue, and deferred maintenance status for planned and corrective maintenance work orders for high, medium and low criticality. As part of the mentioned level of documentation requirements the review team requested that those KPI’s as a minimum shall be made available to OD completed with approved Exemptions and MOC.

It was also observed that estimated work hours for preventive and corrective maintenance workorders are not defined in the maintenance system. The maintenance review team highlighted that overdue PM’s in itself are not representing a transparent picture of the overdue maintenance. To achieve a transparent overview of overdue maintenance, work hours shall be defined in the maintenance system to ensure that the correct actions will be taken to correct this.

An outline of the Audit regime was explained in the meeting, with annual QMS self-audits and HQ audits every 3rd year.
Quality verifications of SLB third parties are scheduled and managed by the SLB procurement organization based on criticality.
The SLB maintenance team could not demonstrate that the procurement team has any quality verifications or audits planned in 2025 towards third parties with critical deliveries of cement unit components.

Critical spare parts were also discussed in the meeting. SLB plan to be fully compliant with NORSOK Z-008 Risk based maintenance and consequence classification. SLB elaborated on the three levels of critical spare parts based on severity, occurrence and detectability.

Barrier strategy and performance standards were discussed as part of the agenda. SLB presented a general bow-tie approach and presented various SLB standards where performance criteria were defined. However currently SLB does not meet the performance standard requirement towards technical barrier elements on the cement unit as per Norsok Z-008 and Norsok S-001.

Conclusions:
Since SLB is currently not operating the cement unit on DSY, the review team is not able to define any finding as nonconformances towards regulatory and contractual requirements with respect to Risk Based Maintenance. Significant improvement suggestions have been observed during the review which, if not corrected in due time before the commencement date of the rig contract towards OKEA, will automatically lead to red risk non-conformities. As such those observations shall be corrected before OKEA starts the Bestla development campaign with DSY.

The full list of improvement suggestions and observations are listed below, as were discussed and agreed as follows below during the close-out of the meeting.